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ABSTRACT
Do firms have adequate incentives to invest in anti-terrorism mechanisms?  This paper develops
a framework for addressing this issue when the security choices by one agent affect the risks faced by
others. We utilize the airline security problem to illustrate how the incentive by one airline to invest in
baggage checking is affected by the decisions made by others. Specifically if an airline believes that others
will not invest in security systems it has much less economic incentive to do so on its own.  Private sector
mechanisms such as insurance and liability will not necessarily lead to an efficient outcome. To induce
adoption of security measures one must turn to regulation, taxation or institutional coordinating
mechanisms such as industry associations. We compare the airline security example with problems
having a similar structure (i.e., computer security and fire protection) as well as those with different
structures  (i.e., theft protection and vaccinations). The paper concludes with suggestions for future
research.
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Security is topical. Many individuals and organizations are considering whether to invest 
more in security precautions. In this paper we investigate the economic incentives for such 
investment. Do individuals and firms have incentives to carry out socially appropriate levels of 
security investment? Or are there instead reasons to suppose that they will systematically 
underinvest in this area? Ayres and Levitt (1998) have demonstrated the social benefits of 
protection when individuals invest in unobservable precautionary measures such as the LoJack 
car retrieval system that criminals cannot detect.  Interestingly, they suggest that the social 
benefits here greatly exceeded the private benefits. This might naturally suggest a sub-optimal 
level of private investment.  
In this paper we also show that in situations where the security levels of members of a 
group are interdependent, there are positive externalities associated with investing in protection. 
However, in contrast to expenditures on crime protection, the incentives to invest in security may 
be perverse: the dependence of one agent’s security on the behavior of others may completely 
negate the payoffs it receives from its own investment in protective measures. We shall refer to 
these cross-effects between one agent’s incentives and the behavior of the others as 
contamination. 
   4
We shall illustrate our general argument by reference to an airline that is considering 
whether to install a baggage checking system voluntarily for added protection. In making this 
decision it needs to balance the cost of installing and operating such a system with the reduction 
in the risk of an explosion from a piece of luggage not only from the passengers who check in 
with it, but from the bags of passengers who check in on other airlines and then transfer to it. 
As we will show below, the incentive to invest in security is greatly diminished if other 
airlines fail to adopt protective measures. The decision by all agents to remain unprotected may 
be a Nash equilibrium, even though from both the vantage points of each individual unit and of 
society as a whole there are net benefits to everyone from investing in protection.  We will focus 
primarily on the airline security case, but will show below that there are several other interesting 
and topical problems that have similar, though subtly different, analytical structures.  
One of these problems concerns the security of a computer network. It is generally the 
case that once a hacker or virus reaches one computer on a network, the remaining computers 
can be more easily compromised. Because of this possibility of contamination the incentive that 
any one computer owner has to secure his machine is reduced if he believes that other machines 
on the network will be insecure. Another analytically similar problem concerns fire safety in 
apartment buildings – the risk that an apartment faces depends on the chance of a fire originating 
domestically coupled with the risk of a fire starting elsewhere and spreading. The incentive a 
homeowner has to take fire precautions, such as installing a sprinkler, depends on her 
expectations about the policies that will be chosen by other residents in the building. In both of 
these cases the expectation that others will not adopt security measures reduces the incentive that 
a particular agent has to invest in security, in some cases to zero.    5
To our knowledge this problem of interdependent security has not been examined in the 
literature. Orszag and Stiglitz (2002) develop a model for the optimal size of a fire department 
and point out that homeowners fail to take into account the positive externalities associated with 
reducing damage to their neighbors by building safer homes. They also note that an increase in 
government investment in security will tend to reduce individual investment. What they do not 
show is that the economic incentives for investing in preventive measures decrease as the 
number of unprotected homes increases. There is thus a need for either public sector intervention 
or coordinating mechanisms to induce this activity and reduce the need for larger fire 
departments.  
One question that the present paper addresses is how to induce tipping mechanisms as 
characterized by Schelling (1968). In other words, how can we ensure that enough agents will 
invest in security so that all the others will follow suit? At some level this aspect of the problem 
is similar to the phenomena that arise with network externalities, where a community will 
standardize on one of several competing products after enough members have adopted this. 
(Arthur, 1994; Heal, 1999). In this context the incentive for any agent to invest in security is an 
increasing function of how many others have already done so. Once a critical mass has invested, 
then all others will want to do the same.
1 
The next section of the paper develops a model of agents whose security is 
interdependent. It illustrates the nature of the externalities that create a disincentive to invest in 
protection. This model is based on the airline scenario outlined above. Section 3 discusses how 
one can internalize these externalities through intervention by the public sector and/or by 
coordinating mechanisms. In Section 4 we examine other forms of protection, namely computer 
                                                 
1 See Heal (1994, 1999b) for a similar concept of “minimum critical coalition” in the context of interdependency via 
environmental externalities. 
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security measures, fire protection systems, burglar alarms and vaccines to see in what ways these 
differ from the model characterizing airline security. The concluding section discusses future 
research.  
2. A Model of Interdependent Security 
We consider a 1 period model where there are n risk-neutral agents designated as  
Ai   i=1...n. These are the primary actors who have to choose whether or not to invest in security. 
This is taken to be a discrete choice: they either invest or do not invest. In the airline scenario, 
these are airlines choosing whether or not to invest in a baggage screening system for luggage 
that is being checked.  
Each agent faces a risk of damage; if the damage materializes then the loss is L. There are 
two possible ways in which damage can occur: it can start either on the agent's own property or 
on the property of another agent. The probability of damage arising on the agent's own property 
if it has not invested in security precautions is p, so that the expected loss from this event is pL. If 
it has invested in security precautions then this risk is zero. The situation is completely 
symmetric and all agents are identical. 
As we noted, damage to an agent may arise from an agent's own property or from the 
property of another. For the airline scenario, thorough scanning of baggage that an airline has 
checked itself will prevent damage from these bags, but there could still be an explosive in a bag 
transferred from another airline. There is therefore an additional risk of loss due to 
contamination from other agents who have not invested in loss prevention. In the airline case, 
these probabilities are interpreted as follows. The probability that a bag containing a bomb will 
be checked onto an airline without a security system is p. The probability that a dangerous bag,   7
once accepted for carriage by one airline, is transferred by it to another is denoted by q. If there 
are n ≥ 2 airlines, the probability that this bag will be transferred from airline i to airline j is  
q/(n-1).  
We assume throughout that the damages that result from multiple security failures are no 
more severe than those resulting from a single failure, so that the damages are not additive. In the 
airline baggage scenario, this amounts to an assumption that one act of terrorism is as serious as 
several.
2 The key issue is whether or not there is a failure, not how many failures there are. We 
could almost think of the definition of a catastrophe as being an event so serious that it is 
difficult to imagine an alternative event with greater consequences. We focus first on the case of 
two agents, as this presents the basic intuitions in a simple framework, and then turn to the multi-
agent case.  
The 2- Agent Problem 
Assume that each agent has two choices: to invest in security, S, or not to do so, N. Think 
of S as investing in baggage screening, and N as not doing so. Table 1 shows the payoffs to the 
agents for the four possible outcomes:  
Table 1:  Expected Costs Associated with Investing and Not Investing in Security  
    Agent 2 ( A2 ) 
     S           N 
   S              Y-c,    Y-c       Y-c-qL,  Y -pL 
  Agent 1 ( A1 )       
         N  Y-pL,   Y-c-qL       Y –[pL + (1-p) qL], Y –[pL+ (1-p)qL]   
 
Here Y is the income of each agent before any expenditure on security or any losses from 
the risks faced. The cost of investing in security is c. The rationale for these payoffs is 
straightforward. If both invest in security, then each incurs a cost of c and faces no losses from 
                                                 
2 One act of terrorism was sufficient to lead to the demise of Pan American Airways. The destruction of Pan Am 
flight 103 in 1988 was due to a bomb checked in on another airline and then transferred to Pan Am. 
(http://www.cbc.ca/news/indepth/lockerbie/investigation.html)   8
damage so that their net incomes are Y-c. If A1 invests and A2 does not (top right entry) then A1 
incurs an investment cost of c and also runs the risk of a loss from damage emanating from A2. 
The probability of A2 contaminating A1 is q, so that A1's expected loss from damage originating 
elsewhere is qL. This cost represents the negative externality imposed by A2 on A1. In this case 
A2 incurs no investment costs and faces no risk of contagion but does face the risk of damage 
originating at home, pL. The lower left payoffs are just the mirror image of these.  
If neither agent invests, then both have an expected payoff of Y- pL - ( 1-p) qL. The term 
pL here reflects the risk of damage originating at home. The term qL, that shows the expected 
loss from damage originating at the other agent and transferred elsewhere, is multiplied by (1-p) 
to reflect the assumption that the damage can only occur once. So the risk of contagion only 
matters to an agent in the case in which that agent does not suffer damage originating at home.  
Now that the payoffs have been specified, we can ask the natural question: under what 
conditions will the agents invest in security? It is clear from Table 1 that for investment in 
security to be a dominant strategy, we need  
Y-c>Y-pL    and Y-c-qL>Y-pL-( 1-p) qL 
The first inequality just says that c<pL, that is, the cost of investing in security must be 
less than the expected loss, a natural condition for an isolated agent. The second inequality is 
more interesting: it reduces to c<pL- pqL = pL( 1-q) . This is clearly a tighter inequality 
reflecting the possibility of contagion from the second agent. This possibility reduces the 
incentive to invest in security. Why? Because in isolation investment in security buys the agent 
complete freedom from risk; with the possibility of contagion it does not. Even after investment 
there remains a risk of damage emanating from the other agent. Investing in security buys you 
less when there is the possibility of contamination from others.    9
  In the 2-agent problem with identical costs we can determine the optimal behavior of 
each agent if they both make decisions simultaneously without any communication. In this non-
cooperative environment if c < pL (1-q), then both agents will want to invest in protective 
measures (S,S); if  c> pL then neither agent will want to invest in protection  (N,N). If pL<c<pL 
(1-q) then there are two Nash equilibria (S,S) and (N,N) and the solution to this game is 
indeterminate. 
This solution concept is illustrated below with a numerical example.  Suppose that p= .1, 
q=.2 , L=1000  and  c= 95. The matrix in Table 1 is now represented as Table 2. 
Table 2:   Expected Costs Associated with Investing and Not Investing in Security 
for Illustrative Example    
    Agent 2 ( A2 ) 
     S           N 
     S              Y-95,    Y-95     Y-295,  Y -100 
  Agent 1   ( A1 )    
   N      Y-100,  Y-295     Y-280,  Y- 280 
 
One can see that if A2 has protection (S), then it is worthwhile for A1 to also invest in 
security since its expected losses will be reduced by pL= 100 and it will only have to spend 95 
on the security measure. However, if A2 does not invest in security (N), then there is still a 
chance that a loss will occur to A1. Hence the benefits of security to A1 will only be pL(1-q) = 80  
which is less than the cost of the protective measure . Hence A1 will not want to invest in 
protection.  In other words, either both agents invest in security or neither of them do so. These 
are the two Nash equilibria.  
Multiple agents 
Now we move on to the more general case of n identical agents all symmetrically placed. 
Think of many airlines exchanging baggage at a large hub. If all but one of the agents has 
invested in security, then the position of the remaining one is identical to its position in isolation:   10
there is no risk of contagion. At the other extreme, suppose none of the other n-1 agents have 
invested; then if the remaining agent is protected it still faces risks originating at n-1 other 
locations. 
We begin by illustrating the argument with the case of three agents, denoted Ai  i=1,2,3. 
Interpret them for concreteness as airlines deciding whether or not to install baggage security 
systems where bags are only transferred once between airlines. In how many ways can airline 1 
(A1) be victim of a bomb attack if it has instituted a baggage security system but none of the 
other airlines have done so? In other words, what are the negative externalities associated with 
contamination from other airlines? Airline 1 can suffer damage from a bag checked onto A2 and 
then transferred to A1. This event occurs with probability q/2 since we assume that the bag from 
airline 2 has an equal chance of being transferred to either A1 or A3.  A bomb-laden bag from A3 
can also damage A1. This can occur when A2 does not transfer a dangerous bag to A1 but A3 
does. This event occurs with probability (1-q/2)q/2.  Since all agents are identical the negative 
externalities are the same for every airline. 
Define X(3,0) as the expected negative externality to any airline i that has installed a 
baggage checking system if there are 3 airlines and none of the others have instituted this 
security measure.   X(3,0)   is given by    (q/2) [1+(1-q/2)]L.   When one other airline has 
installed a security measure then  the expected negative externality X(3,1) is given by   (q/2)L 
since there is only one 1 airline without a security system and it can ship a contaminated bag 
with probability  q/2  to airline i . 
If there are four airlines then the expected negative externalities become: 
  X(4,2) =  (q/3) L 
  X (4,1) = (q/3) [1 +(1-q/3)] L 
  X (4,0) = (q/3) [1+(1-q/3) +(1-q/3)
2]L 
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For n>1 agents this generalizes to 
                       n-2    
X(n,0) =   [q/(n-1)] Σ  [ [1-q
 /(n-1)]
t]L= {1- [1-q/(n-1)]
n-1} L                               (1) 
                        
t=0      
 
The limit of this expression as n tends to infinity is  
Lim   X(n,0)= (1-e
-q) L 
                             
n→∞  
 
We can summarize this in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: If there are n agents none of whom have invested in security, then the expected 
loss inflicted on any one by all others is X(n,0)= {1- [1-q/(n-1)]
n-1} L.  As n increases this 
converges to (1-e
-q) L 
If q=0 then X(n,0) is zero; X(n,0)  increases monotonically in q reaching its largest value 
of 0.63L when q=1.  Intuitively this makes sense: with no chance of baggage transfer there is no 
negative externality; if bags are transferred to other airlines with probability one then the 
expected negative externality to any airline is 63% of the possible loss. For a given value of q, 
the term X(n,0)  decreases monotonically as n increases, taking on the value of qL for n=2 and 
falling to (1-e
-q)L as n approaches infinity. So the externality is largest when there is only one 
other airline and decreases as the number of airlines rises. Again there is an obvious intuition 
here: as the number of airlines increases, the chance of a transferred bag reaching any particular 
airline falls. Figure 1 shows how the externality decreases with n from 2 to 100 for q=.3 (upper 
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Figure 1: X(n,0) for L=1 and q=0.2 or q=0.3 
 
When there are n firms in total, the payoff to A1 from not investing in security when the 
other n-1 are also not investing is   
Y –pL  -(1-p) X(n,0) 
The payoff from A1 investing is   
Y-c –X(n,0) 
 Hence investing is the better strategy if and only if     
   c < p[L – X(n,0)] 
This implies that there is less incentive to invest in protection with higher negative externalities 
associated with contamination. So from Figure 1 we see that the upper bound on c rises with n 
and the incentive to invest increases.  
What is the structure of the set of possible Nash equilibria? Return to Table 1. As we 
have already seen, (S,S) is a dominant strategy equilibrium if c<pL(1-q). (S,S) is a Nash 
equilibrium if c<pL, a weaker condition. (N,N) is a dominant strategy equilibrium if c>pL and a   13
Nash equilibrium if c>pL(1-q). There is an interval pL(1-q)<c<pL in which both (S,S) and (N,N) 
are Nash equilibria.  
Could there be other Nash equilibria in this game? The answer is no, at least as long as all 
agents are identical. In the two agent case  for (N,S) to be an equilibrium it is necessary that Y-
pL>Y-c or c>pL and also Y-c-qL>Y-pL-(1-p)qL or c<pL(1-q)  which is obviously impossible. So 
the only equilibria are where both agents invest or both do not invest. Does this change as the 
number of agents increases? It does not: even with many identical agents, they all will choose the 
same strategy at a Nash equilibrium.  
Proposition 2:  Consider a Nash equilibrium in the n-agent problem (n>2) defined above (each 
agent has two strategies N and S with payoffs described by equation (1)). At such a Nash 
equilibrium all agents will choose the same strategy. 
Proof. Assume to the contrary that (S,S,…..S,N) is a Nash equilibrium. Without loss of 
generality we assume the last agent chooses N and all others choose S. Then for all 
agents from 1 to n-1 this implies that the strategy S is a best response to n-2 agents 
choosing S and one choosing N. But for agent n, N is the best response if there are n-1 
agents choosing S. However if S is a best response to n-2 agents choosing S and 1 agent 
choosing N, then it is also a best response to n-1 agents choosing S; changing one choice 
from N to S will reduce the externality on all other agents and increase the incentive to 
choose  S. This contradicts the assumption that agents choose differently at a Nash 
equilibrium. The same argument can be applied to cases in which more than one agent 
chooses a divergent strategy.  
Note that if the agents have different costs of investing in security measures, then even in the 2-
agent case we may find an equilibrium where one agent one invests in security and the other   14
does not. Specifically, let c1 and c2 be the costs of the two agents: then (N,S) will be a Nash 
equilibrium if c1>pL and c2<pL(1-q). This requires that the two costs differ by at least pqL. 
There are three critical values of c that need to be considered in determining the nature of 
the equilibria when there are n agents in the system.  Let c** represent the value of c above 
which all agents will be indifferent between investing and not wanting to invest in protection.  
This will occur if there are no externalities so that each agent captures all the benefits of 
protection. In other words, c**=pL and is invariant to the number of agents in the system. Let 
c*(n, 0) represent the value of c below which an agent will want to invest in security if none of 
the other n-1 agents are protected.  Then c*(n, 0) = p[L – X(n,0)]. For the above example where 
L=1000, p=.1 and q=.2, if there are n=10 airlines, X(10,0)=18.4, c**=100  and c*(10,0) = 81.6. 
If c>100   then the only Nash equilibrium is (N,N,...N) and none of the agents will want to invest 
in protection. If c <81.6 then the only Nash equilibrium is (S,S,....S). For 81.6 ≤ c ≤ 100 there are 
two Nash equilibria  (N,N,....N) and (S,S,.....S).
3  
Implications of the Solution    
The problem of encouraging individuals to adopt protective measures resembles the 
prisoner’s dilemma problem in the sense that it is often advantageous for all agents to adopt 
protection for both themselves and society, but none of them have an economic incentive to do 
so on their own. A classic prisoner’s dilemma is where each firm has a cost incentive to 
undertake some activity (e.g. polluting the environment). It knows that if there were a 
coordinating mechanism so that none of them engaged in this activity, they would each be better 
off economically while at the same time improving social welfare. (e.g., firms’ profits would be 
higher and the air and/or water would be cleaner.)  
                                                 
3 When c=81.6 any agent is indifferent between investing and not investing if none of the other agents have invested 
in security. Similarly if  c=100 then any agent is indifferent between investing and not investing if all of the other 
agents have invested in security.   15
For certain cost structures the interdependent security problem has the same 
characteristics as a prisoner’s dilemma. More specifically in the 2-agent case if pL < c   then 
each agent prefers not to invest in security [i.e. (N,S) > (S,S) for agent 1 and  (S,N) > (S,S) for 
agent 2] leading to a single Nash equilibrium at (N,N) . However, if  pL +(1-p)qL > c then both 
agents would be better off at (S,S) than at (N,N).  
For other situations where pL>c  but  c>pL(1-q)  as illustrated in Table 2, the 
interdependent security problem differs from the prisoner’s dilemma, since there are two Nash 
equilibria (S,S) and (N,N). Now, for example, if agent 1 can convince agent 2 to invest in 
security, there will be an economic incentive for agent 1 to voluntarily follow suit. In the context 
of multiple agents, an airline is more likely to invest in a baggage checking system if it knows 
that some of the other airlines have taken this step. Their risk is now more under their own 
control and more affected by their investment in security. The challenge is how to internalize the 
externality for some or all the agents, so a typical agent is willing to invest in security.  
3.  Internalizing Externalities 
The only ways to encourage agents to invest in security when they face the possibility of 
contamination from others is to develop a set of economic incentives (either positive or negative) 
that makes it more attractive for some or all of the involved individuals to take protective 
actions. Below we examine a set of different measures ranging from private market mechanisms 
to regulations to collective choice that may internalize the externalities associated with protective 
measures where there are interdependencies between agents.  
Insurance   
Insurance appears to be a logical way for encouraging security since it rewards those who 
adopt protective measures by reducing their premium to reflect the lower risk. However, in order   16
to deal with the externalities created by others who do not invest in protection, the agent causing 
the damage must be forced to pay for the losses.  For example, if a bag transferred from Airline 1 
to Airline 2 exploded, Airline 1’s insurer would have to pay for the cost of the damage to 2.  This 
is not how current insurance practice operates. An insurer who provides protection to Ai  is 
responsible for losses incurred by agent i no matter who caused them.
4  One reason for this 
contractual arrangement between insurer and insured is the difficulty in assigning causality for a 
particular event.
5  
Interestingly enough a monopolistic insurer would want to internalize the externality if it 
were providing coverage to all agents. An agent who adopted a protective measure would be 
given premium reductions not only for the reduced losses to its own unit but also for the 
reduction in losses to others. Social insurance programs have the advantage over a competitive 
insurance market in encouraging this type of protection. Under such a program as long as c < pL, 
there would be an incentive for all agents to invest in security and the Nash equilibrium would be 
(S,S.....S).      
Liability     
If an agent who caused damage to other agents by not adopting a protective measure were 
held liable for these losses, then the legal system would offer another way to internalize the 
externality due to interdependent security. However we do not know of any cases where an agent 
has been held liable for the damages to another agent because he did not invest in protection. In 
the case of the airline example, it would be difficult to know whether an unchecked bag from 
                                                 
4 If the damage from an insured risk is due to negligence or intentional behavior then there are normally clauses in 
the insurance policy that indicate that losses are not covered (e.g. a fire caused by arson). 
5 With respect to fire damage a classic case is  H.R. Moch Co., Inc. v Rensselaer Water Co.   247N.Y.160, 159 N.E. 
896 which ruled that  “A wrongdoer who by negligence sets fire to a building is liable in damages to the owner 
where the fire has its origin, but not to other owners who are injured when it spreads”. We are indebted to Victor 
Goldberg who provided us with this case.   17
another airline caused damage to the plane or whether it was due to one of the airline’s own 
bags. The costs of settling these disputes appear to favor a liability system where each agent is 
responsible for its own losses unless there is a clear case of negligence on the part of some other 
agent.  
Taxation 
A more direct way of encouraging greater security is to levy a tax of t dollars on any 
entity that does not invest in protection. In the case of identical agents one would want the tax to 
be high enough so that the only Nash equilibrium would be (S,S....S).  The magnitude of the tax 
depends on the number of agents and the cost of protection, c.  
Suppose that there are n agents in the pool and none of them have invested in security. 
The government wants to determine the minimal tax t* to induce each agent to protect itself. As 
shown in section 2 the costs to an agent who invests in protection will be  
               c +X(n,0). 
If an agent does not invest in protection and is taxed t dollars, its cost will be 
pL+(1-p)X(n,0) +t 
Hence for any agent to want to invest in protection when no one else does, the tax must 
be high enough so that  
                          t > c- p[L- X(n,0)]     
If  c ≤  p(L-  X(n,0)) then there is no need to impose any tax on an agent for it to want to 
invest in protection. Hence  
 t*=  max {0,  c-p(L- X(n,0)] } 
Consider the illustrative airline example where n=10 and X(10,0)= 18.6. If t=0, then an 
agent will only invest in security if no one else does when c< p[L-X(10,0) ]= 81.4. If    c> 81.4,   18
then t*= c - 81.4.
6   Note that a subsidy on protective measures plays the identical role in 
inducing agents to invest in security as does a tax. The cost c is reduced due to the subsidy, so 
that the protective measure is more attractive to the agent.  
Regulations and Standards   
The possibility of contamination by other units provides a rationale for well-enforced 
regulations and standards that require individuals and firms to adopt protective mechanisms. The 
need for baggage review systems took on greater importance after the Sept. 11
th tragedies and 
has led the government to require their use by the airlines. The U.S. Congress now requires all 
airlines to have a checked baggage security program to screen all bags for bombs (NY Times 
2002).  
Building codes for reducing damage from natural disasters are standard in most hazard-
prone states and can be justified in part by the externalities associated with damage from a 
disaster [Cohen and Noll (1981)]. When a building collapses it may create externalities in the form 
of economic dislocations and other social costs that are beyond the economic loss suffered by the 
owners. These may not be taken into account when the owners or developers evaluate the 
importance of adopting a specific mitigation measure [Kleindorfer and Kunreuther (1999)]. 
Coordinating Mechanisms    
One way to convince the n independent agents that it would be in everyone’s best 
interests to invest in protection is to utilize some official organization to coordinate these 
decisions.  For example, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the official airline 
association, has indicated on its Web site that since Sept. 11
th they “have intensified hand and 
                                                 
6 Suppose that  c>c** so that there is no incentive for any agent to invest in protection even if all other  
n-1 agents have protected themselves. If there are additional indirect benefits from protection besides a reduction in 
the expected loss (pL), then the government may want to impose a tax on unprotected agents that is high enough to 
induce everyone to protect themselves.    19
checked baggage processing”. IATA could have made the case to all the airlines that they would 
be better off if each one of them utilized internal baggage checking so that the government would 
not have had to require this.  
An association can play a coordinating role by stipulating that any member has to follow 
certain rules and regulations including the adoption of security measures and has the right of 
refusal should they be asked to do business with an agent that is not a member of the association 
and/or has not subscribed to the ruling. IATA could require all bags to be reviewed carefully and 
each airline could indicate that it would not accept in-transit bags from airlines that did not 
adhere to this regulation.   
Apparently IATA follows this type of policy in agreements regarding pricing policies. If 
an airline does not belong to IATA and you want to transfer to this airline from an originating 
IATA airline, the originating airline will not make a reservation for you.  Furthermore an IATA 
airline will not honor a non-IATA airline ticket unless it conforms to the IATA tariff conference 
(e.g. US Air would not honor a JetBlue airline ticket).
7  
On a more informal level it might be possible to establish social norms by organizations 
that generate pressure to invest in protection (Sunstein 1996). This is not easy to do since there 
are normally no visible benefits from the investment until a disaster occurs. To the extent that 
opinion leaders can convince others in their community that these investments will yield 
expected benefits to everyone in the form of lower losses and higher property values, such a 
strategy may work.
8   
                                                 
7  See the IATA web site at http://www.iata.org/membership/steps.asp#10 
8 See Ostrom (1990), particularly chapter 6 that deals with the conditions under which norms evolve governing the 
use of common property resources.   20
4. Relationship to Other Forms of Protection 
In this section we examine other forms of protection to determine their similarities to and 
differences from the airline security problem. We first examine other types of interdependent 
security problems, namely computer viruses and fires that spread. We then turn to theft 
protection and vaccinations.  
Computer Security 
    Protecting computer networks from viruses and from hackers is similar to investing in 
airline security. Each agent on the network can make its own investment in protection, but the 
effectiveness of this investment depends on those made by others. There is however one major 
difference. If one computer is unprotected then malicious external agents could attack the entire 
system via this one computer. A hacker who gains access to a network via one weak link can in 
many cases compromise all computers on the network. In other words, one unprotected node can 
endanger all the other nodes even if they have invested in protection.
9 In the airline security 
problem only one plane can be affected by a contaminated piece of luggage. 
As one unprotected computer can impact all n-1 other computers whether or not they are 
protected, the expected negative externalities associated with the computer security problem are 
much greater than for airline security. More specifically if computer i is protected and all the 
other n-1 computers are not then 
                n-2 
 X(n,0)  =   qL Σ   [ (1-q)
t]= [1-(1-q)
n-1]L  
                
t=0 
  
As the number of agents increases without limit then   
             ∞  
X(n,0) =   qL Σ   [ (1-q)
t]=  qL/[1-(1-q)]=L        (2) 
                          
t=0  
                                                 
9 We are indebted to Yechiam Yemini for this information.   21
 
This implies that   in the limit   c < p[L-X(n,0)]= 0  so that investing in computer security can 
never be a dominant strategy as long as the cost of protection is positive. Formally we can now 
state: 
Proposition 3: In an interdependent security problem where one compromised agent can 
contaminate all others, investment in security can never be a dominant strategy if its cost is 
positive.  
A comparison of Proposition 3 with the equivalent result given by Proposition 1 for the 
airline case is instructive. When n=2 the two cases are by definition the same. For n =∞ and q=1 
the airline negative externality is 0.63L whereas in the computer network case the number is just 
L. Setting q=1 gets the airline case as close as possible to the computer network case: when q=1 
there is bound to be an externality between agents, but the intensity is reduced because the 
impact is restricted to a single agent.  
Fire Protection 
  Investing in sprinkler systems in an apartment in a multi-unit building to reduce the 
potential losses from fire has a similar structure to the computer security problem. A fire that 
starts in an unprotected apartment can spread to other units and damage them whether or not they 
have sprinkler systems installed. If a fire in any unit could spread to all the other units 
simultaneously then this problem would be identical in structure to a computer virus.   In reality 
a fire normally destroys units only on the same or adjacent floors of buildings.
10 Hence any 
apartment unit in the building would only be subject to damage from at most m of the n units in 
the building. In this case suppose apartment 1 was protected with a sprinkler system and all the 
                                                 
10 One of us, Heal, lives in an apartment building and was recently told by the building’s insurance agent that a 
serious fire usually destroys the floor on which it starts, and damages two floors above via smoke and flames and 
two below are harmed through water damage from putting the fire out.    22
other m units surrounding it were unprotected. Then the negative externalities it would incur 
would have an expected value given by  
              m-1 
 X(n,0)  =   qL Σ   [ (1-q)
t] 
                
t=0 
  
As the number of units m that can impact on a given apartment decreases, then X(n,0) also 
decreases and the apartment unit will be more likely to invest in protection.  
Theft Protection    
Consider the case where a burglar is considering which one of a set of identical houses in 
a neighborhood to rob. His concern is the chance of being caught in attempting to break into the 
house. By installing a burglar alarm you increase the chance that the intruder will be detected.   If 
you announce publicly with a sign that your house has been protected, then the burglar will look 
for greener pastures to invade. In other words, installing a burglar alarm in your house, and 
announcing it, decreases the chances that your house will be robbed and increases the chance that 
other unprotected homes will be targets for the thief.
11 
Let  p be the probability of a loss (L) to any house when none of the homes in the area 
have invested in protection. For example, if a thief randomly chooses one of the n houses in the 
area as a target, then p= 1/n.  Now suppose that you purchase a burglar alarm that can always 
detect a thief should he attempt to break into your house and you publicize that your house is 
protected in this way. The risk of a loss to your house is now 0, independent of what other 
houses have done. In other words, there is no possible contamination from other houses in the 
area as in the interdependent security problem. In fact, there is now an increase in the probability 
that one of the other houses in the neighborhood will be robbed.  Let p′ represent this revised 
                                                 
11 We appreciate a helpful discussion with Daniel Kahneman on this point   23
probability of a theft with p′ > p. In the case of random theft, your house is off-limits and the 
other n-1 houses have a p′ = 1/n-1 chance of being burglarized.  In other words, installing a 
burglar alarm imposes a negative externality by shifting crime to those who are unprotected.   
If all homes are identical then there will be two Nash equilibria just as in the 
interdependent security problem, but the solution is now much more straightforward because 
there is no contamination.  If the cost of the burglar alarm is c and individuals are risk neutral 
then no one will invest in a burglar alarm if c > pL.  If c < pL then everyone will want to protect 
themselves. Recall, however, that p is here endogenous and depends on who has invested in an 
alarm.   
Suppose that instead of publicly revealing that one has a burglar alarm, one informs the 
local police that this action has been taken, so that criminals cannot determine who is protected. 
In this case installing an alarm system does not reduce the probability that an individual house 
will be broken into. It may however provide a positive externality by reducing the chances of a 
crime occurring in the community if the burglars know that a certain percentage of homes are 
protected. This type of unobservable precaution is similar to the Lojack car retrieval system. 
Ayres and Levitt (1998) show that the marginal social benefit of an additional unit of Lojack is 
as much as 15 times greater than the marginal social cost in high crime areas. However, those 
who install Lojack in their cars obtain less then 10 percent of the total social benefits associated 
with this protective measure. 
Vaccinations    
The decision on whether to get vaccinated is similar in some ways but also differs from 
the interdependent security problem. Clearly there are externalities here: if I am vaccinated 
against a disease, you will not catch it from me. So one person investing in protection conveys   24
positive externalities on others, as in the interdependent security problems discussed in this 
paper.
12 This much is common to both issues.  
Consider however the Nash equilibria that may arise when people decide whether or not 
to be vaccinated. Suppose that tomorrow an effective vaccine against influenza is approved for 
general use. When choosing whether to be vaccinated or not, each person has to anticipate the 
choices of others. If everyone else were to be vaccinated, then there would be no point in my 
being vaccinated, as I would be in no danger of catching the flu. At the other extreme, if I 
believed that most people would not be vaccinated, this would increase my incentive to be 
vaccinated.  
From this we can see that if the vaccination cost is sufficiently low and the risk is 
sufficiently high then a situation where no one is vaccinated cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
13  On 
the other hand, everyone being vaccinated is also not a Nash equilibrium, for if I believe that 
everyone else will get vaccinated then I will not want to be vaccinated. In contrast to the 
interdependent security problem discussed in this paper the Nash equilibrium will be a mixture 
of  Ns and Ss even when all individuals are identical. Some individuals will decide to get 
vaccinated while others prefer to be unprotected. Those who decide to get vaccinated will have 
no incentive to change their minds because there will be enough people who are unprotected so 
that the chances of being contaminated and contracting the disease will be greater than the cost 
and potential side-effects of the vaccine. Similarly those who have not protected themselves will 
                                                 
12 Philipson (2001) has a nice summary of recent research on economic epidemiology and the role that vaccines play 
in reducing the spread of diseases. 
13 See Hershey et al (1994) for a more detailed discussion of the role that free riding, and bandwagoning play in 
vaccination decisions.     25
find that the expected costs and side-effects of the vaccine will exceed the expected benefits 
from being protected.
14   
5. Future Research 
The decision as to whether one wants to undertake protection against events where there 
is interdependence between your actions and those of others raises a number of interesting 
theoretical and empirical questions. We discuss some of these issues in this section. 
Differential Costs and Risks  
The nature of stable Nash equilibria for the problems considered above and the types of 
policy recommendations may change as one introduces differential costs across the agents who 
are considering whether or not to invest in security.  
Consider each airline deciding whether to invest in a baggage security system. As pointed 
out in Section 2, if there are differential costs and/or risks between companies, we would expect 
to find a stable Nash equilibrium that consisted of a combination of S’s and N’s. Some agents 
would have low enough costs that they would want to invest in the protective measure while 
others would find it too expensive.  
One needs to reexamine the types of prescriptive recommendations for dealing with the 
issue of differential risks and/or costs.  For example, suppose that some airlines had a greater 
chance of contaminating others because they had more bags transferred to other airlines. Should 
one tax them more if they do not invest in a baggage security system?  If differential taxation is 
not feasible for political reasons should one resort to other regulations to deal with the 
interdependent security problem? One option would be to require only bags that are transferred 
                                                 
14 We thank Richard Zeckhauser for pointing out this feature of the Nash equilibrium to us.   26
to other airlines to go thru a security system. This would avoid the problem of negative 
externalities.
15 
Multi-Period and Dynamic Models 
The decision on whether or not to invest in security normally involves multi-period 
considerations since there is an upfront investment cost that needs to be compared with the 
benefits over the life of the protective measure. An airline that invests in a baggage security 
system knows that this measure promises to offer benefits for a number of years. Hence one 
needs to discount these positive returns by an appropriate interest rate and specify the relevant 
time interval in determining whether or not to invest in these actions. There may be some 
uncertainty with respect to both of these parameters. 
From the point of view of dynamics, ones own decision on whether to incur the cost of 
protection depends on how many others have taken similar actions. How do you get the process 
of investing in security started?  Should one subsidize or provide extra benefits to those who are 
willing to be innovators in this regard to encourage others to take similar actions?  In order to 
answer these and other questions one needs to develop sequential models of decision-making. 
These models will need to consider the special characteristics of the hazard and the nature of the 
contamination effects. A dynamic model for airline or computer security will have a different set 
of interactions than one for theft protection or immunization against specific diseases. The policy 
recommendations will also reflect these differences.  
Behavioral Considerations 
The models we have developed and discussed above all assumed that individuals made 
their decisions by comparing their expected benefits with and without protection to the costs of 
investing in security.  We will label this a rational model of behavior. 
                                                 
15 We thank Ido Erev for suggesting this option to us.   27
There is a growing literature in behavioral economics that suggest that individuals make 
choices in ways that differ from the rational model of choice. (Kahneman and Tversky  2000).  
With respect to protective measures there is evidence from controlled field studies and laboratory 
experiments that many individuals are not willing to invest in security for a number of reasons 
that include myopia, high discount rates and budget constraints. (Kunreuther, Onculer and Slovic  
2000).   In the models considered above there were also no internal positive effects associated 
with protective measures. Many individuals invest in security to relieve anxiety and worry about 
what they perceive might happen to them or to others so as to gain peace of mind (Baron, 
Hershey and Kunreuther 2000). 
16  
A more realistic model of interdependent security that incorporated these behavioral 
factors as well as people’s misperceptions of the risk may suggest a different set of policy 
recommendations than would be implied by a rational model of choice. For example, if agents 
were reluctant to invest in protection because they were myopic, then some type of loan may 
enable them to discern the long-term benefits of the protective measure. A long-term loan would 
also help relieve budget constraints that may deter some individuals or firms from incurring the 
upfront costs of the risk-reducing measure.  
Future Empirical Studies 
The issues discussed above suggest a number of empirical studies on interdependent 
security. Given the concern with terrorism both in the United States and the rest of the world it 
would be interesting to learn more about the factors which are leading some organizations to 
invest in security and why others are deterred from doing so.  
                                                 
16 Of course, if these individuals become aware that substantial losses may be imposed on them or their firm from 
others who are unprotected, then this new knowledge may increase their anxiety by showing that investing in these 
protective measures has more limited benefits than they had initially assumed it would. 
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What actions can the public sector take in encouraging property owners and organizations 
to invest in certain protective measures? What are the appropriate roles of taxation, regulations 
and standards (e.g. well-enforced building codes)? How can market mechanisms such as 
insurance, bank loans and potential liability aid in this process?  What institutional mechanisms 
would aid the decision process of agents regarding protective measures when others will be 
affected?  Can industry associations, like IATA for the airlines, play an important role in 
facilitating actions by individual companies?   
Concluding Comments 
The events of September 11
th have highlighted the importance of addressing the 
questions associated with interdependent security. This paper should be a viewed as a first step in 
providing a framework for undertaking future theoretical and empirical studies in this area. By 
developing a richer set of models and testing them through controlled experiments and field 
studies we are hopeful that a viable set of policies will emerge for dealing with the challenges we 
face today in dealing with hazards where there are risks of contamination. 
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